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A number of studies have shown that education reforms extending compulsory schooling 
reduce criminal behavior of those affected by the reform. We consider the effects of a major 
Swedish educational reform on crime by exploiting its staggered implementation across 
Sweden. We first show that the reform reduced crime rates for the generation directly 
affected by the reform. We then show that the benefits extended to the next generation with 
large reductions in the crime rates of the children of those affected. The effect operates only 
through the father and points in the direction of improved parenting rather than resources. 
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support. 1 Introduction
Crime imposes huge costs on society and has an exceptionally strong in-
tergenerational link. Earlier papers have demonstrated that crime and
education are related and that indeed policies that increase education can
reduce crime (see Lochner and Moretti (2004)). This is important because
it shows the broader impact of educational reform and a way of improving
outcomes for adults, beyond deterrence and punishment. There are strong
theoretical reasons why this should be the case (Becker (1981), Lochner
(2004), Freeman (1999)). An outstanding question is, however, to what
extent education policies have long term eﬀects on criminal behavior in
the sense that it also aﬀects criminal behavior of the children of those di-
rectly aﬀected by educational reforms. There are good reasons to expect
so, considering the strong intergenerational correlations in criminality and
the fact that education policies can aﬀect parental resources as well as skills
important for parenting.
In this paper we empirically demonstrate that education policy, which
increases compulsory schooling, can reduce the crime rates of the children
of those directly aﬀected by the reform. We study the eﬀects on criminality
of the comprehensive school reform in Sweden that was implemented as a
social experiment between 1949 and 1962. Meghir and Palme (2005) show
that this reform signiﬁcantly increased the number of years of schooling
as well as labor earnings for those assigned to the reform, in particular
for children from low SES families. We show that the children who were
assigned to the reform signiﬁcantly decreased their criminal activities later
in life. We then go on to demonstrate that the male children of those aﬀected
by the reform have substantial reductions in crime rates. The eﬀect is only
present if the father was aﬀected by the reform. This points away from
increased resources as the main mechanism changing the intergenerational
2outcomes and more towards improved parenting and the importance of role
models (see Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010)).
The two earlier papers by Lochner and Moretti (2004) and Machin,
Marie, and Vujić (2011) respectively study the relation between compul-
sory schooling laws and criminal behavior. Lochner and Moretti (2004)
use changes in compulsory schooling laws across time between US states
to identify the eﬀect of increasing education on crime. Machin, Marie, and
Vujić (2011) compare criminal behavior of the cohorts just before and just
after the implementation of the comprehensive school system in Britain.
We use data containing individual information on all convictions and prison
sentences, along with detailed background characteristics covering the en-
tire population. The dataset also links information on three generations.
In addition to that, our paper extends two important aspects of the pre-
vious literature. First, we compare the criminal behavior of two groups,
distinguished by the school system they were exposed to, but active in the
same labor markets at the same point in time, and who belong to the same
cohort. This means that we are able to identify the eﬀect of the education
reform net of general equilibrium eﬀects; separately from possible cohort
eﬀects, eﬀects originating from regional or local labor market shocks; or
any secular trends in criminal behavior on the national level. Second, by
linking the individuals aﬀected by the reform to data on their children we
are then able to estimate the eﬀect of the reform on the next generation.
Our result point out the importance that educational reform can have on
improving intergenerational outcomes in ways not documented before.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses previous the-
oretical and empirical work on the relation between both own education
and criminal behavior as well as parental education and criminal behav-
ior; Section 3 provides an overview of the comprehensive school reform in
Sweden; Section 4 describes the data; Section 5 presents empirical results
3on the association between educational attainments and criminal behav-
ior as well as intergenerational associations of crime; Section 6 discusses
our identiﬁcation strategy; Section 7 presents the eﬀects of the education
reform on educational attainment of both generations before showing our
main empirical results on the eﬀect of the comprehensive school reform and
various crime outcomes of both generations followed by empirically results
on possible mechanisms; Section 8 concludes.
2 The Impact of Education on Crime
2.1 The Impact of Education on Crime within a Gen-
eration
The links between economic incentives and crime have been established
both theoretically and empirically in earlier studies. A prominent example
is Freeman (1999) who outlines an economic model of crime where the
choice between criminal and legal activity is determined by comparing the
expected utility of each. Grogger (1998), Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard
(2002) Machin and Meghir (2004) and Edmark (2006)1 demonstrate the
importance of wages and labor market opportunities in driving crime. One
implication of this is that improved education may reduce crime.
A number of papers have looked at the link between education and crime
directly. These include Lochner and Moretti (2004) and Machin, Marie, and
Vujić (2011), cited above. A more theoretically based approach was oﬀered
by Lochner (2004) who develops a life cycle model of education and crime
and estimates a negative education-crime relationship. A study, based on
this human capital approach by Williams and Sickles (2002) ﬁnds that
years of schooling has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on crime in adulthood,
1For Sweden Edmark (2006) shows the relationship between unemployment rates and
property crimes on county level.
4and that there is a relationship between crime and other measures of human
capital. Earlier studies support this empirical evidence on the education-
crime relationship; for example Freeman (1996) states for the 1991 US
Census that two thirds of US prison inmates are high-school drop-outs
and 12 percent of 24-35 year old high school drop outs were incarcerated
in 1993. This negative correlation between crime and education has also
been documented in the criminology and sociology literature, for example
Sabates and Feinstein (2008a).2
In the Appendix to this paper we develop a simple theoretical model
in order to better understand the mechanisms through which an education
reform may aﬀect criminal behavior of both the cohort directly aﬀected
by the reform and their children. The model shows that an increase in
compulsory schooling reduces the available time for crime early on;3 it
increases human capital and thus reduces further the incentive to commit
crimes and may increase the chance of remaining in school beyond the new
compulsory level. It may also draw increased investments from parents
further increasing human capital. This reduces crime in the young (school
period) ages. As an adult, the result is increased human capital, which will
reduce adult crime. If there is a habit formation aspect of crime, the early
decline will be reinforced. Thus crime will decline relative to the group
that was not aﬀected by the reform.
An education reform may also generate general equilibrium eﬀects. Gal-
lipoli and Fella (2006) estimate a general equilibrium model of crime and
education. They ﬁnd that increases in education have a signiﬁcant impact
in reducing crime. However, they point out that the general equilibrium
eﬀects, operating through changes in wages as the number of educated
individuals increases, can be substantial.
2See also Sabates and Feinstein (2008b).
3Jacob and Lefgren (2003) give some evidence on this eﬀect and refer to it as the
incapacitation eﬀect.
5As shown in Meghir and Palme (2005) the Swedish school reform signif-
icantly increased the number of years of schooling as well as labor earnings
of those individuals who went through the new school system, in particu-
lar for individuals originating from homes with low educated fathers, i.e.
not more than statutory level of schooling. For those individuals we would
expect a decrease in criminal behavior due to the reform. For individuals
aﬀected by the reform but having parents with more than statutory ed-
ucation the impact is less clear cut. For this group there is no eﬀect on
educational attainment. However, it changed the way they were educated
because it abolished early selection and tracking, which aﬀected primarily
this group. It can be argued that quality of education for this group was
diluted for this reason and because the increase in compulsory schooling,
aﬀecting the other group, could have reduced the quality of the peers.4 For
this reason we cannot be conﬁdent that human capital increased for this
group. This is why in our empirical analysis we present overall results as
well as results separately on the lower socio-economic group.
2.2 Parental Education and Children’s Crime
Intergenerational associations of criminal behavior have been documented
in the criminology literature. From the economics point of view this ques-
tion relates to the investments that parents make on their children and
the way that parental education may aﬀect such investments, see Becker
(1981).5 In the Swedish context Hjalmarsson and Lindquist (forthcom-
ing) document a strong correlation between crime of fathers and children
4A previous study by Deming (forthcoming) highlights the importance of school
quality and it’s potential impact on crime.
5For some empirical work see for example Carneiro, Meghir, and Parey (forthcom-
ing). Moreover, there is direct evidence that better childhood environments and early
education can reduce crime rates, see for example the results form the Perry pre-school
experiment presented in Schweinhart, Montie, Xiang, Barnett, Belﬁeld, and Nores (2005)
and Cunha and Heckman (2007).
6of both genders using the Stockholm Birth Cohort Study. In a second
Swedish study the same authors Hjalmarsson and Lindquist (2010) focus
on parent-child correlations in crime using adoption data, to aim to deter-
mine through which factors mothers and fathers inﬂuence child criminality,
which follows the approach of Björklund, Lindahl, and Plug (2006).
The theoretical model presented in the Appendix does also help us to
better understand the possible eﬀects of the criminal behavior of children
to the cohort primarily aﬀected by the reform. The children of the af-
fected generation all experience the same education system because the
reform was rolled out nationally in 1962. They only diﬀer by the fact that
some have parents who faced the new education system and as a result
have more parental education and more resources. These diﬀerences will
lead to higher parental investments in their children and eventually higher
educational attainment relative to the children in the comparison group,
whose parents did not go through the reform, see for example Holmlund,
Lindhal, and Plug (forthcoming). Educational attainment may increase
because, according to mounting evidence, an increase in early parental in-
vestments in children improves cognition and social skills and hence reduces
the costs of education. In addition, the increased parental resources allow
more transfers to children alleviating ﬁnancial constraints for education.
These channels imply an increase in human capital reducing crimes at all
life stages, as described above.
In addition to the mechanisms brought forward by our theoretical model,
one can think of at least four indirect eﬀects of parental reform assignment
on child criminal behavior. These eﬀects are addressed empirically in Sec-
tion 7.5 on mechanisms. (1) Assortative mating. In the context of an
educational reform, this may imply that those assigned to the reform tend
to get married with people with higher educational attainments and/or
earnings, which may have an augmenting eﬀect on parental resources; (2)
7Fertility. There may be a causal eﬀect of the attained educational level
on fertility behavior, see e.g. Hotz, Klerman, and Willis (1997) which may
aﬀect the criminal behavior of the children, since the parents are able to
devote more resources to fewer children; (3) Parental criminal behavior.
Previous empirical research has shown a very strong link in criminal be-
havior across generations. Although, it is not likely to be an entirely causal
eﬀect it is conceivable that parts of it come from parental role model ef-
fects. Since there may be a direct eﬀect of the reform on parental criminal
behavior, there may also be a secondary eﬀect on the children’s risk of
being convicted for a crime; (4) Mobility. We know from previous studies
that there is a strong element of peer group eﬀects in criminal behavior,
see e.g. Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996). The education reform
may have induced those assigned to the reform in the parental generation
to move out from criminal areas, which, in turn, may have aﬀected the
criminal behavior in the child generation.
3 The 1950 Swedish Education Reform and
the Social Experiment
3.1 The Reform
Prior to the implementation of the comprehensive school reform, pupils
attended a common basic compulsory school (folkskolan) until grade six.
After the sixth grade pupils were selected to either continue one or, in
mainly urban areas, two years in the basic compulsory school, or to at-
tend the three year junior secondary school (realskolan). The selection of
pupils into the two diﬀerent school tracks was based on their past grades.
The pre-reform compulsory school was in most cases administered at the
municipality level. The junior secondary school was a prerequisite for the
8subsequent upper secondary school, which, in turn, was required for higher
education.
By 1940 a consensus emerged that the education system had to be re-
formed. First, by that time, Sweden, compared to other countries, had
a relatively short compulsory education: the student ﬁnished compulsory
school at age 13 or 14. As a comparison, enrolment rates in high-schools
were above 80 percent in most parts of the United States (see Goldin
(1999)). Second, an increasing proportion of students wanted to continue
on to junior secondary school. The share of students who actually con-
tinued in the junior secondary school increased from about 10 percent in
1930 to about 40 percent in 1950 (see Erikson and Jonsson (1993)). The
resources for that kind of education were, however, not suﬃcient to meet
the demand. Finally, the fact that the school curriculum diﬀered across
municipalities and that there was no uniﬁed path to higher education were
seen as limitations of the existing educational system.
In 1948 a parliamentary school committee proposed a school reform
that implemented a new nine-year compulsory comprehensive school.6 The
comprehensive school reform had three main elements:
1. An extension of the number of years of compulsory schooling to 9
years in the entire country.
2. Abolition of early selection. Although pupils in the comprehensive
schools were able to choose between three tracks after the sixth grade
- one track including vocational training, a general track, and an
academic level preparing for later upper secondary school - they were
kept in common schools and classes until the ninth grade.
3. Introduction of a national curriculum. The pre-reform compulsory
6The school reform and its development are described in Meghir and Palme (2003),
Meghir and Palme (2005), and Holmlund (2007). For more detailed reference on the
reform, see Marklund (1980) and Marklund (1981).
9schools were administrated by municipalities and the pre-reform cur-
riculum varied between municipalities.
3.2 The Social Experiment
The social experiment with the new comprehensive nine-year compulsory
school started during an assessment period between 1949 and 1962, when
the ﬁnal curriculum was decided.7 The proposed new school system, as
described above, was introduced in municipalities or parts of city com-
munities, which in 1952 numbered 1,055 (including 18 city communities).
The selection of municipalities was not random. However, the decision to
select the areas was based on an attempt to choose areas that were repre-
sentative for the entire country, both in terms of demographics as well as
geographically. At ﬁrst the National Board of Education contacted the mu-
nicipalities, or sometimes they themselves applied to participate. From this
pool of applicants a "representative" sample of municipalities was chosen.
There were at least two reasons as to why a nationwide experiment was
set up before the implementation of the new school. First, there was a
widespread belief in scientiﬁc evaluations among the generation of Swedish
politicians who were active at that time, in particular among those in-
volved in education policy.8 In their view, an experiment was a means
for improving diﬀerent aspects of the proposed new school. Second, and
more importantly, it was a way of resolving diﬀerent views, primarily be-
tween those who wanted to maintain the selective school system and those
advocating for a comprehensive school, within the parliamentary school
committee. An experiment with a comprehensive school was a ﬁrst step
towards a compromise.
7The oﬃcial evaluation National School Board (1959) was mainly of administrative
nature. Details on this evaluation are also described in Marklund (1981).
8See Marklund (1981) for several quotes on that.
10Figure 1: Proportion of individuals in sample assigned to the reform
When a municipality introduced the new school system it implemented
it either for the cohort of pupils who where in ﬁfth grade at the time of
the decision or for those who were currently in the ﬁrst grade, eﬀectively
delaying the start of the programme. Table 11 in the Appendix shows the
take up rates of the reform between 1949 and 1962. In our analysis we
consider cohorts born between 1945 and 1955. Figure 1 shows the number
of observations in each one-year birth cohort and the proportion assigned
to the reform.
4 The Data
4.1 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
We use a sample originally obtained from Sweden’s population census. To
link individuals across generations we used the multi-generation register,
provided by Statistics Sweden.9 We are able to link and use three gen-
erations in our analysis: the parent generation which is the generation
directly aﬀected by the reform and it consists of all individuals born in
9Statistics Sweden(2003) Flergenerationregistret 2002. En beskrivning av innehåll
och kvalitet. Statistics Sweden. Avdelning för Befolknings och Välfärdsstatistik.
11Sweden between 1945 and 1955, their parents and their children labeled
as the grandparent generation and the children generation, accordingly.10
This corresponds to 1,340,857 persons, 658,056 males and 655,801 females
in the parent generation. From the birth certiﬁcates we know date of birth,
parish of birth and gender. We restrict our sample of the children genera-
tion to those who have reached the age of criminal responsibility (age 15)
in 2008, the last year for which we have crime records. This corresponds
to 1,621,758 children, 833,564 sons and 788,194 daughters in the children
generation that were born between 1959 and 1991.
The reform assignment variable is obtained in two steps. First, we use
the name of the church parish of birth in order to obtain the birth munic-
ipality code according to the 1952 Swedish municipality division. Second,
based on the year and municipality of birth, we use an algorithm based
on historical evidence on reform implementation in each municipality pro-
vided by and described in Holmlund (2007) to assign reform status to each
individual in the sample of those aﬀected by the reform.
Information on the individual’s highest education level was obtained
and matched on to our sample from the Swedish National Education Reg-
ister. For the grandparent generation we used data from the 1970 census,
which only provides information on individuals younger than age 60 in the
year of the census, allowing us to obtain education information for 78.4 per-
cent of mothers and for 65.8 percent of fathers of the parent generation. We
analyze the eﬀects of the reform separately for those individuals originating
from the low educated grandparent generation. This is deﬁned as those indi-
viduals of the grandparent generation with the lowest pre-reform statutory
level of compulsory schooling. Hence, we analyze the eﬀects of the reform
separately for the parent generation with low educated fathers, and for
10Even though we have information on biological and adoptive parents and children,
we exclude all individuals who have been adopted, or who have adopted children them-
selves.
12the children generation with low educated grandfathers, which amounts to
roughly 63-65 percent of the sample with available education information.11
Information on all convictions in entire Sweden covering the time pe-
riod between 1981 and 2008 is provided by the Swedish National Council
for Crime Prevention (Brå) and has been linked to individuals in our data
set using the unique personal identifying number. This means we are able
to link individuals to actual convictions, which is an advantage of our study
compared to previous studies on education reform eﬀects on criminal be-
havior (Lochner and Moretti (2004) and Machin, Marie, and Vujić (2011)).
We have detailed information on the number of crimes the person has been
convicted for in each trial, the date of conviction, as well as the penalty for
each crime. One conviction/court trial often covers several crimes.
Table 1: Number of all convictions in Sweden 1981-
2008, for cohorts born 1945-1955 and their children
Ever convicted Ever convicted to prison
Male Female Male Female
Panel A: Parent generation
Number 173,395 46,633 36,870 3,126
Percent 25.31 7.11 5.38 0.48
Panel B: Children generation
Number 220,494 69,843 28,588 2,001
Percent 26.45 8.86 3.43 0.25
Table 1 shows the number of convicted persons for the two genera-
tions, the 1945-1955 cohorts and their children, covered by our data on
convictions. Over this time window, 25 percent of all males in the par-
ent generation have been convicted at least once, and over 5 percent have
been to prison. Only 7 percent of women have been convicted, and 0.5
11Table 12 in the Appendix summarizes the number of available observations in each
generation and subgroup.
13percent have received a prison sentence. Importantly, the data on criminal
convictions only cover the time range between 1981 to 2008, which means
that the generations born between 1945 and 1955 will be between the ages
of 26 to 63, whereas their children’s convictions cover the ages of 15 to
49. The picture for the children generation looks very similar to the one
of their parents, with slightly higher percentages of the population having
been convicted, possibly attributable to the younger age window.
Table 13 in the Appendix shows the crime-age distribution for the entire
data set not only covering the cohorts of interest. The largest amount of
convictions are for people between 15 and 24, followed by the age range 25
to 34, and further decreasing with age. This pattern of convictions by age
is also shown in ﬁgures 1 and 2 in the Appendix that show the average rate
of convictions by age and by cohorts for the cohorts 1970-1989 using men
in our children sample.
The stated conviction rates for men of roughly 25 percent is a surpris-
ingly high proportion of the population, which prompted us to look into
this in greater detail. First, note that the type of crimes included in our
data have to be severe enough to involve a trial and a conviction in court.
This includes the more serious traﬃc violations such as driving without a
licence, driving under the inﬂuence of alcohol or drugs, and causing bod-
ily harm, but does not include speeding or parking tickets. As such they
do represent serious anti-social behavior. Unfortunately, we were not yet
given the speciﬁc type of crime for which an individual in our data has
been convicted for.12 However, a good idea of the composition of crime can
be obtained in Table 15 in the Appendix where we show a breakdown of
type of crime convictions in 2009.
In addition to the data on convictions we have data on all suspected
12We are waiting to obtain a variable that indicates the type of crime from the Brå
crime registry.
14crimes between 1991 and 2009. It includes a variable that gives a detailed
code on the type of suspected crime.13 Although this data overstates actual
charges and crimes we use it to provide an idea of the distribution of traﬃc
crimes. Table 16 presents all categories that are related to traﬃc violations
and the number of oﬀences between January 1991 and June 2009. The
total number of suspected crimes during this time were 4,073,985 of which
16.9 percent were traﬃc crimes. Again, all of these traﬃc crime categories
are severe violations. Additional support of such high conviction rates in
Sweden is provided by other Swedish studies that have shown similar con-
viction rates, see Hjalmarsson and Lindquist (forthcoming), Hjalmarsson
and Lindquist (2010), and Grönqvist (2011).
4.2 Parental Background, Education and Crime
Table 2 shows the Linear Probability Model estimation results of whether
an individual has ever been convicted and ever been convicted to a prison
sentence on years of own schooling (Panel A), as well as on years of father’s
and mother’s schooling for the children generation, (Panel B). One year
of own schooling for men in the parent generation is associated with a
decrease of the probability of a conviction by 1.9 percentage points and a
decrease in the probability of a prison sentence by 0.8 percentage points;
these correspond to a 7.5% reduction in convictions and 15% reduction in
prison sentences respectively.14
Panel B also shows a very strong association between both mother’s
and father’s education and son’s criminal behavior, even controlling for the
child’s own education.15
13Detailed coding of crime types in: Kodning av brott, Anvisningar och regler, Version
8.0, Reviderad 1. Juli 2010, brå brottsförebyggande rådet.
14When computing the standard errors we cluster by birth municipality.
15We present the relationship between crime and the levels of education in the Ap-
pendix (see Tables 17 and 18), revealing a steep decline in crime participation associated
with higher levels of own and parental education. A similar decline is also recorded for
15Table 2: Linear probability model estimates of the association between own
or parental education and criminal convictions
Panel A: Men born 45-55
Dependent variables: Probability conviction Probability prison
 p = 0:2531  p = 0:0538
Years of schooling, own -1.916*** -0.806***
(0.093) (0.057)
Corresponding percentage change -7.570 -14.981
Birth cohort/municipality dummies y y
Observations 662,875 662,875
Panel B: Sons of men and women born 45-55
Dependent variables: Probability conviction Probability prison
 p = 0:2645  p = 0:0343
Years of schooling, own -2.635*** -0.585***
(0.029) (0.013)
Corresponding percentage change -9.962 -17.055
Years of schooling, father -0.568*** -0.118***
(0.035) (0.014)
Corresponding percentage change -2.147 -3.440
Years of schooling, mother -0.598*** -0.144***
(0.026) (0.009)
Corresponding percentage change -2.261 -4.198
Birth cohort/municipality dummies y y
Observations 675,625 675,625
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results scaled by 100. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, clustered by birth municipality. All regressions include a full set of birth cohort
dummies and birth municipality dummies of the individual. Sample of sons for whom at least one
parent was born 45-55.
Finally Table 3 illustrates the intergenerational links of crime. The
probability of ever being convicted increases by over 15 percentage points
if a son has a convicted father. This corresponds to a 61 percent increase
of the total share of convicted sons. Children whose father have ever been
convicted to a prison sentence are 8.5 percentage points more likely to end
incarceration rates.
16Table 3: Linear probability model estimates of the association between the
son’s probability of ever being convicted or imprisoned and the father having
ever been convicted or imprisoned
Panel A: Sons of men born 45-55
(1) (2)
Dependent variables: Probability conviction Probability prison
 p = 0:245  p = 0:029
Father convicted/imprisoned 15.039*** 8.464***
(0.252) (0.204)
Percentage change 61.384 291.862
Birth cohort/municipality dummies y y
Observations 559,085 559,085
Panel B: Sons of men born 45-55 with low educated father
Dependent variables: Probability conviction Probability prison
 p = 0:247  p = 0:028
Father convicted/imprisoned 14.361*** 8.409***
(0.255) (0.275)
Percentage change 58.142 300.321
Birth cohort/municipality dummies y y
Observations 241,716 241,716
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Eﬀects scaled by 100. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality of sons. All regressions include a full set of birth cohort
and municipality dummies of son.
up in prison, which translates to a 292 percent increase in the share of sons
convicted to prison.
5 Empirical Strategy
The main outcome variables we use are whether an individual was ever
convicted during the observation window 1981-2008 and whether someone
has ever received a prison sentence. Finally, we also consider whether
someone has been convicted more than once as opposed to once or not at
all (recidivism) and the number of convictions (including zero).
All the analysis is done for males only and we distinguish them by the
17education of the grandparent generation.16 We present two sets of estimates.
The ﬁrst relate to the impact of the reform on the parent generation, i.e.
the generation aﬀected by the educational reform directly. The second
relate to the impact of the reform on the children of the parent generation.
The youngest person in the parent generation sample is 26 when the
crime records made available to us start. Hence, the eﬀect we estimate is
not attributable to simply keeping the kids oﬀ the streets by getting them
to attend school. On the other hand we are missing part of the crime career
of individuals, because a lot of the crime happens at a younger age; this
is not a cause for bias since we observe the same data for the comparison
groups as well. For the child generation we observe the criminal history
from the start. Any impacts we we estimate for the child generation are not
due to diﬀerent schooling systems since they all attend the same reformed
system.
Since the reform was not randomized we control for potential diﬀerences
across treatment and control municipalities using a diﬀerence in diﬀerences
approach. This compares the change in the crime across cohorts in mu-
nicipalities that implemented the reform for the younger cohort but not
the older one to the change in crime rate across the same cohorts living in
municipalities where there was no change in policy for these same cohorts.
In practice we do this for all cohorts in our window and all municipalities.
Thus our approach is best described by the regression
y
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i;m;t is the latent crime "intensity" outcome observed for person i
born in municipality m and in birth cohort t. A conviction corresponds
to y
i;m;t > 0. Ri;m;t is the reform indicator, which equals one if individ-
16The female crime rate is very small and has not been aﬀected by the reform.
18ual i belongs to a municipality and cohort that has been assigned to the
new school system; ti is a vector of indicator variables indicating to which
cohort individual i belongs to and Mi is a vector of indicator variables in-
dicating in which municipality individual i was born. i;m;t is conditionally
independent of Ri;m;t.
Based on the latent equation above we ﬁrst use the linear probability
model, which we estimate by GLS. The main reason for this speciﬁcation
is computational convenience: there are about 1,000 municipality and 11
cohort ﬁxed eﬀects.
As an alternative, we also estimate a Logit model and we solve the
computational problem by using minimum distance: ﬁrst we group the
data by municipality and cohort and estimate the within-cell conviction
probability (Pmt). We then use minimum distance to impose the restriction
that this probability is generated from a logistic distribution with a linear









In practice we need to drop all cells where the log odds ratio is not
deﬁned.17 Implicitly the Logit and the LP models deal with such cells and
the nonlinear form of the probabilities in a diﬀerent way and hence we
needed to check if the results diﬀer: they do not.
The key identifying assumption that delivers the diﬀerence in diﬀer-
ences approach is that in the absence of the reform, crime propensity can
be written as y
it = F(t;"i) where the distribution of the unobservable "i
is independent of cohort t but can vary across municipalities and where
F(:;:) is strictly monotonic in this unobservable. In terms of an economic
17This amounts to about 6 percent of cells.
19model, If we think of this as human capital then this means that individuals
with higher human capital always commit less crime. The linear speciﬁca-
tion above imposes the monotonicity assumption. The discrete nature of
the dependent variable also requires a distributional assumption on "i for
identiﬁcation.18
6 Results
6.1 The Reform and Educational Attainment
Panel A in Table 4 shows the estimates of the eﬀects of the education reform
on years of schooling for the parent generation. The results are presented
for all men born between 1945 and 1955 as well as separately for those with
a low educated father and those with a father who has obtained more than
the lowest pre-reform education level, respectively.
The reform signiﬁcantly increased years of schooling for men of the
aﬀected generation. The overall eﬀect is larger for those individuals with
low educated fathers, as reported in Meghir and Palme (2005). However
in this broader and larger sample we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect (at the 10%
level) on those with higher educated grandparents.
Panel B in Table 4 shows the eﬀects of father’s or mother’s reform
assignment on years of schooling of their sons, separated by education levels
of their grandfather. Across the generations the eﬀects of the reform on
years of schooling seems to diminish. None of the estimates for the child
generation are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
18see Athey and Imbens (2006) and Altonji and Blank (1999)
20Table 4: Reform eﬀects on years of schooling for
the generation directly aﬀected by the reform and
their sons
(1) (2) (3)
Sample: All Low educ High educ
Panel A: Men born 45-55
Dependent variable: Own years of schooling
Reform 0.216*** 0.324*** 0.061*
(0.044) (0.029) (0.036)
Observations 602,084 261,873 138,829
Panel B: Sons of parent generation
Dependent variable: Son’s years of schooling
Reform father -0.021 0.024 -0.015
(0.032) (0.036) (0.057)
Observations 325,766 143,729 64,948
Reform mother 0.002 0.025 -0.009
(0.027) (0.030) (0.050)
Observations 421,541 185,831 82,764
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Ef-
fects are scaled by 100, robust standard errors in parentheses.
Panel A: standard errors clustered by municipality of birth; all
regressions include a full set of birth municipality dummies and
birth cohort dummies of individual. Panel B: standard errors
clustered by father’s or mother’s birth municipality; all regres-
sions include a full set of birth municipality and birth cohort
dummies of father or mother.
6.2 The Reform and Crime in the Parent Generation
Table 5 and 6 show the estimates of the eﬀect of being assigned to the re-
form on three diﬀerent outcomes: the probability of ever being convicted,
recidivism19 and total number of convictions. Table 5 shows the results for
the entire sample, while Table 6 shows the corresponding results separately
for the sub-sample of those with a low educated grandparent generation:
for this group the impact of the reform on the educational attainment of
the parent generation is strongest.
19being convicted at least twice versus once or not at all
21In addition, we split up the results on the basis of diﬀerent cohort groups
because the overall results may be diluted by the fact that the oldest birth
cohorts are observed from an age where crime rates are relatively low. For
example, the oldest cohort included, those born in 1945, are aged 36 when
we start to record their criminal behavior.
We use a linear probability model for the outcomes of ever being con-
victed as well as recidivism and a negative binomial model for the number
of convictions. All speciﬁcations include ﬁxed eﬀects for birth municipality
as well as birth cohorts and the standard errors are corrected for clustering
within municipality of birth, allowing for both spatial and serial correlation.
Column 1 in Table 5 shows the results for the entire sample. The point
estimate is signiﬁcant but not very precise. However, if we restrict the
sample to cohorts where data allow us to observe most of the criminal
careers, we obtain signiﬁcant and large eﬀects on all outcomes. On the
probability of being convicted, the estimate for the youngest cohort, born
in 1954 or 1955, is highly signiﬁcant suggesting a 1.3 percentage points
decrease in crime; this corresponds to a 5 percent decrease in the probability
of ever being convicted as a result of being assigned to the post reform
school system. Comparing the results in Tables 5 and 6 suggests that the
eﬀect is somewhat stronger in the group originating from homes with low
educated fathers whose educational outcomes were more strongly aﬀected
by the reform.
To put these eﬀects into perspective to years of schooling we compute
an indirect least squares estimate, reported in Tables 5 and 6. This instru-
mental variable approach relies on the assumption that the reform only
aﬀected our outcomes through its impact on parental education. The ILS
22Table 5: Estimates of the eﬀects of the education reform on the probability of ever being
convicted, being convicted at least twice and the total number of crimes individuals have
been convicted for, by birth cohort groups, all education levels of father.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample of all men born: 45-55 50-55 51-55 52-55 53-55 54-55
Dependent variable: indicator for having been convicted at least once
Probability conviction 0.253 0.268 0.271 0.275 0.278 0.284
Reform -0.645 -0.456 -0.532* -1.028*** -1.076** -1.329***
(0.405) (0.305) (0.318) (0.396) (0.490) (0.479)
Percentage change -2.548 -1.700 -1.960 -3.744 -3.866 -4.685
Years of schooling (ILS) -2.986 -2.111 -2.463 -4.759 -4.981 -6.153
Dependent variable: indicator for having been convicted at least twice
Probability recidivism 0.133 0.146 0.149 0.151 0.153 0.157
Reform -0.671* -0.279 -0.124 -0.530* -0.552 -0.749*
(0.392) (0.227) (0.243) (0.283) (0.346) (0.452)
Percentage change -5.045 -1.911 -0.832 -3.510 -3.608 -4.771
Dependent variable: number of crimes convicted for
Average number of crimes 1.309 1.578 1.646 1.696 1.748 1.828
Reform 0.027 -0.071 -0.038 -0.122 -0.078 -0.121
(0.035) (0.062) (0.067) (0.086) (0.083) (0.092)
Observations 622,583 319,093 263,592 210,399 157,155 103,761
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal eﬀects are scaled by 100. Robust standard
errors in parantheses, clustered by municipality of birth. All regressions include a full set of birth municipality and
birth cohort dummies. The ﬁrst two sets of reported estimates in both panels are from a linear probability estimation
with weighted least squares for the dependent variables probability of being convicted at least once and probability
of being convicted at least twice. The used weights are:
p
x0b(1   x0b), which are obtained from a ﬁrst stage OLS
estimation. The last set of estimates in both panels for the dependent variable number of total crimes convicted for
are the marginal eﬀects of the negative binomial estimation. The calculations for the implicit IV are based on the
estimations of the eﬀects of the reform on years of schooling for the parent generation in Table 4.
estimate20 suggests that one year of schooling decreases the probability of
ever being convicted for men born 1952-1955 by 4.8 percentage points and
by 3.5 percentage points for those with low educated fathers.
Hjalmarsson, Holmlund, and Lindquist (2011) conﬁrm our estimates
on an extended data-set including convictions going back to 1973. They
conﬁrm our general ﬁnding that the reform has an impact on own criminal
20This is computed as the ratio of the reduced form estimate of the reform eﬀects
on the probability of a conviction (Tables 5 and 6) over the ﬁrst stage estimate of the
reform eﬀects on years of schooling (Panel A in Table 4). The ﬁrst stage results show
an 0.216 and 0.324 increase in years of schooling for men and men with low educated
fathers, respectively.
23Table 6: Estimates of the eﬀects of the education reform on the probability of
ever being convicted, being convicted at least twice and the total number of crimes
individuals have been convicted for, by birth cohort groups, low education level of
fathers.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample of men with low educated fathers
born in cohorts: 45-55 50-55 51-55 52-55 53-55 54-55
Dependent variable: indicator for having been convicted at least once
Probability conviction 0.240 0.252 0.255 0.259 0.263 0.269
Reform -0.263 -0.494 -0.579 -1.119* -1.103 -2.094**
(0.304) (0.434) (0.486) (0.661) (0.912) (0.970)
Percentage change -1.098 -1.963 -2.269 -4.324 -4.192 -7.776
Years of Schooling (ILS) -0.812 -1.525 -1.787 -3.454 -3.404 -6.463
Dependent variable: indicator for having been convicted at least twice
Probability recidivism 0.123 0.133 0.136 0.139 0.142 0.146
Reform -0.214 -0.199 -0.151 -0.503 -0.471 -1.140
(0.233) (0.327) (0.366) (0.459) (0.646) (0.714)
Percentage change -1.740 -1.496 -1.110 -3.619 -3.317 -7.808
Dependent variable: number of crimes convicted for
Average number of crimes 1.253 1.473 1.539 1.587 1.647 1.717
Reform -0.030 -0.137* -0.117 -0.250** -0.236* -0.177
(0.047) (0.081) (0.096) (0.124) (0.128) (0.168)
Observations 264,679 150,620 125,952 101,266 76,207 50,222
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal eﬀects are scaled by 100. Robust standard
errors in parantheses, clustered by municipality of birth. All regressions include a full set of birth municipality
and birth cohort dummies. The ﬁrst two sets of reported estimates in both panels are from a linear probability
estimation with weighted least squares for the dependent variables probability of being convicted at least once
and probability of being convicted at least twice. The used weights are:
p
x0b(1   x0b), which are obtained
from a ﬁrst stage OLS estimation. The last set of estimates in both panels for the dependent variable number
of total crimes convicted for are the marginal eﬀects of the negative binomial estimation. The calculations for
the implicit IV are based on the estimations of the eﬀects of the reform on years of schooling for the parent
generation in Table 4.
behavior and that the results get stronger when the period in the life cycle
with the highest rate of criminality are included in the sample. All our
results are consistent with ﬁndings by Lochner and Moretti (2004) and
Machin, Marie, and Vujić (2011) for the US and the UK respectively.
The reform also had an impact on other crime outcome variables, re-
cidivism and number of convicted crimes, and the probability of having
ever been convicted to a prison sentence. The latter results are only pre-
24sented in the Appendix in Table 20. The results indicate that the reform
decreased the probability of recidivism and prison sentence for some of the
cohorts and more strongly so for those originating from a low education
background. We also ﬁnd an eﬀect on the number of convicted crimes on
a 10 percent signiﬁcance level for some cohorts and again stronger eﬀects
for the low SES group.
As a robustness check for our estimates we reestimate the model using
the Logit speciﬁcation. The results from this exercise, reported in the
Appendix, show results very similar to those displayed in Tables 5 and 6,
although the precision is somewhat inferior.
6.3 The Reform and Crime in the Child Generation
Table 7 reports the results of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation of the
eﬀects of the school reform on the three outcomes - probability of being
convicted, recidivism and number of convictions - for the child genera-
tion.21 For the ﬁrst two outcomes we estimate linear probability models
and for the third negative binomial models. Again, for the probability of
being convicted, we additionally estimate a Logit model based on cohort-
municipality cells reported in the Appendix as a sensitivity analysis. We
estimate two speciﬁcations. In the ﬁrst one, we estimate the eﬀects of a
father who attended the new school system on son’s criminal behavior and
in the second one the corresponding eﬀects of a mother attending the post
reform school system. In addition, we present separate results for those
with low educated grandfathers.
The reform signiﬁcantly reduces the probability of having ever been
convicted for the sons of those (fathers) who were assigned to the reform
by 0.6 percentage points. Since the average share of convicted individuals
in this cohort was about 26.5 percent the reduction in criminality was
21The results for prison convictions can be found in the Appendix.
25Table 7: Estimates of father’s and mother’s reform assignment on the probability of their
sons having ever been convicted, having ever been convicted more than twice and the
number of crimes convicted for.
Dependent variables: Son convicted Son convicted Number of crimes
at least once at least twice son convicted for
Sample: All Low educ All Low educ All Low educ
Panel A: Father’s reform assignment
Average dependent var 0.265 0.247 0.131 0.131 1.245 1.210
Reform father -0.650*** -1.02*** -0.321 -0.637** -0.065** -0.040
(0.219) (0.361) (0.233) (0.273) (0.031) (0.050)
Percentage change -2.456 -4.129 -2.450 -4.863
Observations 563,754 243,082 563,754 243,082 563,754 243,082
Panel B: Mother’s reform assignment
Average dependent var 0.265 0.278 0.153 0.150 1.538 1.442
Reform mother -0.159 -0.041 0.041 0.117 0.010 0.069
(0.249) (0.331) (0.214) (0.281) (0.046) (0.055)
Percentage change -0.600 -0.147 0.268 0.780
Observations 595,138 255,075 595,138 255,075 595,138 255,075
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal eﬀects are scaled by 100. Robust Standard errors
in parentheses, clustered by municipality of birth of the father (Panel A) or mother (Panel B). All regressions include a
full set of birth municipality dummies and birth cohort dummies of father or mother. Columns (1)-(4) present estimates
from a linear probability model with weighted least squares, the used weights are:
p
x0b(1   x0b) obtained from ﬁrst
stage OLS estimations. Columns (5)-(6) report the marginal eﬀects of a negative binomial model.
approximately 2.5 percent.22 The eﬀect is stronger in the group with a
low educated paternal grandfather: the reduction in the probability of a
conviction is 1.02 percentage points, which translates to a 4.13 percent
decrease in the share of convicted sons of low educated grandfathers. The
results for the additional outcome variable that measures recidivism, the
probability of having been convicted at least twice are presented in column
(3) for all sons, and for those with low educated grandparents in column
(4). In the group with low educated grandfathers, having a father who
was assigned to the new school system signiﬁcantly reduces the probability
of becoming a repeat oﬀender. We ﬁnd a strong eﬀect of father’s reform
22The marginal eﬀects of the Logit Model estimates are very similar, see Appendix.
26assignment on the total number of crimes for the overall sample of sons,
shown in column (5).23
There are no signiﬁcant eﬀects of reform assignment of mothers on the
probability of a conviction of their sons neither for the entire sample of all
sons, nor for those with a low educated maternal grandfather. This also
holds for the recidivism outcome variable presented in columns (3) and (4)
and the number of convictions shown in columns (5) and (6).24
6.4 The Common Trends Assumption
An identifying assumption underlying the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estima-
tor is that any trend in the outcome variable is common in the treatment
and comparison groups over the period of comparison. This assumption is
untestable because it relates to the counterfactual change in the treatment
group. However, an indication can be obtained by testing whether the
trends are common in the two sets of groups before the reform and indeed
after the reform as well.
In our sample we have 12 groups of municipalities indexed by which
cohort was ﬁrst assigned to the reform. We used only the municipalities
that ﬁrst implemented the reform for the 1947 cohort onwards (i.e. 10 of
the 12 set of municipalities) and compared the trend of criminal behavior of
individuals across these municipalities for all cohorts that were not aﬀected
by the reform. The pooled regression of these groups is y = +t+0m+
0tm+, where m is a set of dummies indicating the group to which the
23We gain more precision of the results presented Table 7 when we exclude those
sons who only appear one, two or three years in the crime records, see Table 23 in
the Appendix. More speciﬁcally, we repeated the linear probability estimation for sons
excluding those who are 15 years, 15 or 16 years, and 15-17 years in the last year for
which we have crime records.
24We repeated the analysis for the children generation using the suspected crime data
and ﬁnd a negative but not signiﬁcant relationship between father’s reform assignment
and sons probability of having ever been suspected for a crime. Results are provided by
the authors upon request. Descriptive tables on suspected crime rates are provided in
the Appendix in Table 14.
27municipality belongs based on the cohort for which it ﬁrst implemented
the reform; t is a linear trend that represents the cohorts 1945-1955. A
joint test of 1 = 2 = ::: = 10 = 0 gives a F statistic of F(9;7,090)=1.15
with P=0.323, with 7,090 cohort-municipality cells before treatment. This
implies the hypothesis of common trends in crime for the pre-treatment
cohorts for all groups of municipalities cannot be rejected.
For post-treatment trends in crime we only compare crime between the
municipalities that implemented the reform for cohorts born before 1954.
We compare the criminal behavior of individuals across these municipalities
for the cohorts aﬀected by the reform. A joint test of equality of the
coeﬃcients on the interaction term of the above pooled model yields F(9,
4,808) with P=0.1303, where 4,808 is the number of cohort-municipality
cells that are treated. This means that the hypothesis of a common trend
in criminal behavior for the treated cohorts is the same across the groups of
municipalities that implemented the reform for diﬀerent cohorts cannot be
rejected. Both these tests are strong evidence in favor of the key identifying
assumption for our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach to the problem.
6.5 Mechanisms
The key result of our paper is that the reform reduced the criminal behavior
of fathers and sons by large and comparable amounts. The persistence of
the eﬀects of this policy puts a diﬀerent perspective on the value of such
reforms because the beneﬁts are multiplied by improving intergenerational
outcomes. We now make an attempt to provide evidence on the mechanisms
that could have led to such improvements.
286.5.1 Resources and Assortative Mating
Meghir and Palme (2005) document that the reform increased the overall
amount of income for those for whom the grandfather generation is low
educated. Moreover,as shown in Table 8 the reform caused men to marry
women with higher earnings by about US $800 a year.25 The spouse is also
less likely to be unemployed. These results point to an increased level of
resources due to the reform, at least for those from a lower SES background.
This could lead to increased investment in children. However this cannot
be the complete story because we obtain no eﬀect on crime when the person
assigned to the reform was the mother, although this implies an equivalent
increase in resources.
Table 8: Reform eﬀects on assortative mating of men in cohorts directly aﬀected by
the reform
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variables: Spouse education Spouse annual labor Spouse unemployed
earnings in SEK
Reform 0.0499 5,462** -0.003***
(0.061) (2,672) (0.001)
Observations 681,764 657,591 675,591
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables measured in 2004. Robust
standard errors in parantheses, clustered by municipality of birth. All regressions include a full set of birth
municipality and birth cohort dummies.
6.5.2 Fertility
The reform could aﬀect fertility bahavior by reducing the total number
of children, increasing the age of ﬁrst birth or changing the spacing of
births, all of which could aﬀect the time and monetary resources invested
in kids. It could also decrease unwanted pregnancies and births.26 In
25see Meghir, Palme, and Simeonova (2011)
26Previous studies provide evidence that unwanted or unplanned children might be
more likely to become oﬀenders, see Donohue and Levitt (2001) and Hunt (2006).
29Table 9 we consider some of these possibilities. Although all results are in
the direction that would imply an improvement in the quality of children
we cannot be conclusive because the estimates are not signiﬁcant. The
only highly signiﬁcant result is the number of children associated with
teenage fathers.27 However, since only 1.7 percent of men have children as
teenagers and, more importantly, the reform only decreased this probability
by between 0.2 and 0.3 percent, this is not enough to explain a large part
of our results.
Table 9: Estimation of the eﬀects of the reform on the probability of ever having a
child, the number of children, the age at birth of ﬁrst child and the probability of
teenage paternity.
Dependent variables: ever child number children age birth ﬁrst child teenage
Speciﬁcation LP Poisson Neg binomial LP
Sample: Men born 45-55
Average dep var 0.813 1.896 27.054 0.017
Reform -0.093 -0.004 0.106 -0.263**
(0.185) (0.007) (0.075) (0.106)
Observations 622,583 622,583 505,679 622,583
Sample: Men born 45-55 with low educated fathers
Average dep var 0.822 1.912 26.524 0.019
Reform -0.096 0.001 0.064 -0.210**
(0.273) (0.010) (0.048) (0.100)
Observations 264,679 264,679 217,517 264,679
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal eﬀects are scaled by 100. Robust standard
errors in parantheses, clustered by birth municipality. All estimations include a full set of municipality dummies
and cohort dummies.
27The results for women are qualitatively the same, the only diﬀerence is that women
who were assigned to the reform are less likely to ever have a child on a 10 percent
signiﬁcance level.
306.5.3 Mobility
A further potential channel for the improvement of child outcomes may
come from improved neighbourhoods and peers. Indeed such a possibil-
ity was an important motivation for "Move to Opportunity" (see Kling,
Liebman, and Katz (2007)). To investigate whether the parent generation
moved to better neighbourhoods following the reform we classify all mu-
nicipalities according to their average income in 1960, i.e. before anyone
aﬀected by the reform entered the labor market28
Table 10 shows results for: indicator variable if individual lives in a
diﬀerent municipality in 1991 compared to their birth municipality in col-
umn (1), indicator variable if individual moved from a lower than median
income birth municipality at 1960 levels to a higher than median income
municipality at 1960 levels in 1991 in column (2), the reversed direction
from high to low income municipalities in columns (3), and if individuals
moved from or remained in a municipality with the same 1960 income clas-
siﬁcation in columns (4) and (5). The results of these estimations show
no signiﬁcant impact of the reform on moves from or to low income mu-
nicipalities and no impact of moves at all. Although the peer group may
have improved through better education this was not further reinforced by
moving to diﬀerent/better neighborhoods.
6.5.4 Father as a role model
Section 5 showed a very strong association between father’s criminal be-
havior and that of the son. As shown in Table 3, among convicted fathers
the probability of the child being convicted is higher by 15 percentage
points, or more than 60 percent. For prison sentences the association is
even stronger: if the father has been convicted to a prison sentence, the
28Details on the classiﬁcation of municipalities is provided in the Appendix.
31Table 10: Reform eﬀects on mobility of individuals in cohorts directly aﬀected by the
reform, by income levels of municipalities before the reform
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variables: Moving Low to High High to Low Low to Low High to High
Panel A: Men born 45-55
Reform -0.562 -0.098 -0.024 0.098 0.024
(0.666) (0.288) (0.226) (0.288) (0.226)
Observations 591,425 591,425 591,425 591,425 591,425
Panel B: Women born 45-55
Reform -0.809 -0.055 -0.006 0.055 0.006
(0.756) (0.331) (0.320) (0.331) (0.320)
Observations 611,142 611,142 611,142 611,142 611,142
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Eﬀects are scaled by 100, robust standard errors, clustered
by municipality of birth in parantheses. All regressions include a full set of birth municipality dummies and birth cohort
dummies of individual. The dependent variables indicated on top of each column are deﬁned as indicator variables
indicating if the individual has moved away from their birth municipality by 1991 (column (1)), moved away from a
lower or higher than median income municipality to a lower or higher than median income municipality (column (2)-
column (5)). Income levels are measured in 1960, before the reform was implemented. Codes of birth municipalities are
transformed into those that they correspond to from 1976 onwards. Low to low/high to high include both cases where
individuals move to another municipality by 1991 that also was of lower/higher than median income in 1960, and those
who remain in the same municipality.
probability that the son is also convicted to prison is higher by more than
290 percent. We cannot establish the extent to which this relationship is
causal. However we note that the reform did decrease fathers’ crime and
improved their educational outcomes. So a possible channel is that fathers
who went through the reform are better role models with improved edu-
cation and lower crime rates. It has been shown that better education for
the mothers improves child outcomes in a number of ways.29 These results
suggest that improving paternal quality aﬀects criminal behavior of sons.
7 Conclusions
Educational reforms have been studied extensively for their impact on ed-
ucational attainment and labor market outcomes. However, they can also
29See for example Carneiro, Meghir, and Parey (forthcoming)
32have other important eﬀects such as improvements in health and reduc-
tion in crime, which have been documented in the literature. Here we
investigate the intergenerational eﬀects that education can have on crime,
by exploiting an important educational reform and the rich administrative
data available in Sweden, linking three generations of individuals. Estab-
lishing these longer term persistent eﬀects is crucial for our understanding
of the real beneﬁts of such interventions. In an earlier paper Meghir and
Palme (2005) demonstrated that the educational reform to the Swedish ed-
ucational system, which we use here, had substantial eﬀects on educational
attainment and earnings, particularly for those with low educated parents.
Using administrative data that compares individuals of the same co-
horts, but educated under diﬀerent systems, we ﬁnd strong negative and
signiﬁcant eﬀects of the reform on crime. Thus, for the youngest cohorts,
born between 1954 and 1955, the point estimate suggests a 1.3 percentage
points, corresponding to 5 percent decrease in the probability of being con-
victed from being assigned to the post reform school system. In the group
from homes with low educated fathers the eﬀect seems to be somewhat
larger, which is consistent with a larger eﬀect on educational attainment.
The striking result of this paper, however, is the eﬀect of the reform on
the sons of those originally aﬀected: there is a signiﬁcant eﬀect of paternal
assignment to the reform on the probability of being convicted correspond-
ing to an average reduction in crime of about 2.5 percent.
The intergenerational eﬀect of education on crime can operate through
several diﬀerent channels. We do not ﬁnd clear evidence of a speciﬁc chan-
nel, although there is evidence of an increase in resources and of improved
role models since the fathers crime rates were reduced. The fact that
the intergenerational eﬀects of crime are driven exclusively by the father
attending the new school system and not by the mother points towards
improved parenting and role models as a key mechanism. The persistent
33intergenerational impact of the reform shows the potential of education
policy to induce broader social change.
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398 APPENDIX
8.1 Theory
To better understand the mechanisms through which educational reform
can aﬀect participation in crime for both generations consider the following
simple model. Human capital is produced by investments in various stages
of the child’s life as well as by overall educational attainment Ec. Suppose
there are two stages, early investments I0 and investments during schooling
I1: The eﬃciency of investments depends on the educational level of the
parent, Ep. Denote the human capital production function by
H = H(I0;I1;EcjEp)
where H0
I0 > 0; H0
I1 > 0; H0
Ec > 0 and H00
I0 < 0; H00
I1 < 0; H00
Ec < 0. Parents
are assumed to care about child quality, which here is just their human
capital. Ignoring dynamics for simplicity, they solve the problem30
max
C;I0;I1
fu(C;H) st C + I0 + I1 = Y
p and H = H(I0;I1;EcjEp)g
where C is parental consumption. In this simple context investments in
children will increase as parental resources Y P increase, so long as H is a











An increase in the marginal productivity of such investments (say due to
an increase in parental education Ep) will lead to more investments in the
30The problem is dynamic sequential, but nothing would be gained in introducing this
notation here.
40children at both stages. This will happen both because the productivity of
investments may increase and because parental resources Y P go up. The
next step is to see how these changes can aﬀect participation in crime.
Consider a very simple model of crime choice in two stages of life. First,
is the educational stage, where the individual can either engage in edu-
cation, crime or work. Then follows the adult stage where there is no
education choice. We start by the latter.
Committing a crime is a period by period decision with no dynamics
(for simplicity). Working leads to income Y (H) which depends on human
capital H. Crime on the other hand yields a return R with some probability
p(H). Being caught, with probability 1 p(H) leads to punishment K(H):
As discussed in Lochner and Moretti (2004), the dependence of K on H
represents the opportunity cost of being incarcerated. Moreover, it also
costs c(H) to participate. This cost can reﬂect the aversion that one may
have to anti-social behavior. We assume that c(H) is increasing in H.
Participation in crime is determined by the condition
p(H)R   (1   p(H))K(H)   c(H)   Y (H) > 0 () engage in crime
An increase in H will increase earnings Y (H) and participation costs
c(H), both implying a reduction in crime. A possible mitigating eﬀect is
that better human capital may make crime more eﬀective and reduce the
probability of capture p(H). In our empirical analysis we only measure
convictions; we assume that a reduction in convictions reﬂects a reduc-
tion in crime participation and not more eﬀective criminals. Thus, other
than the potential eﬀect on p(H), increasing human capital will decrease
participation in crime.
It is also useful to consider the earlier period, when the individual still
41has the option of being in school. Deﬁne the future value as V (H1) =
E max;w(V (H1);V w(H1)) with V  denoting the value of crime and V w
the value for work. ced(H0) denotes the cost of education, which we assume
are declining in H0 (initial human capital). In this ﬁrst period the value of
education, crime and work respectively are given by
V ed =  ced(H0) + V (H
+
1 )
V w = Y (H0) + V (H0)
V k = p(H0)R   (1   p(H0))K(H0)   c(H0) + V (H0)
where H
+
1 denotes that education allows the individual to enter the next
period with higher human capital. The individual choose the activity with
the greatest value. First, note that if schooling is compulsory, then there is
a mechanical reduction in crime, simply because the opportunity to commit
an oﬀence is no longer there (or reduced in practice). Second, an increase
in human capital will increase the value of both schooling and work; the
former because it will reduce the costs of schooling ced(H0) as well as the
future value V (H
+
1 ), the latter because it will increase the current wage as
well as the future value V (H0). So ﬁrst period crime will decline; whether
education will go up is in this context ambiguous.
8.2 Reform Appendix
42Table 11: Quantitative development of the comprehensive school experiment 1949
to 1962.
Year Municipalities Number of Number of
Cumulative Number Percentage share classes students
1949/50 14 1.3 172 2 483
1950/51 20 1.9 379 7 529
1951/52 25 2.4 682 14 635
1952/53 30 2.9 1 009 22 725
1953/54 37 3.5 1 525 35 784
1954/55 46 4.4 2 516 61 498
1955/56 59 5.6 3 394 84 941
1956/57 71 6.7 4 393 109 694
1957/58 96 9.1 5 702 143 370
1958/59 142 13.5 8 036 196 343
1959/60 217 20.6 11 191 266 042
1960/61 295 28.0 14 283 333 094
1961/62 415 39.4 18 665 436 595
Note: The 1952 division of municipalities (total: 1 052). Source: Marklund
438.3 Data appendix




Cohorts 1945-1955 1,340,857 685,056 655,801
Father’s education available 881,742 452,433 429,309
Of which low educated father 560,273 287,396 272,877
Percent 63.54 63.52 63.56
Children generation:
All children of parent generation 1,621,758 833,564 788,194
Paternal grandfather’s education available 802,451 412,619 389,832
Of which with low educated grandfather 511,980 263,319 248,661
Percent 63.80 63.82 63.79
Maternal grandfather’s education available 836,632 430,357 406,275
Of which with low educated grandfather 538,228 276,779 261,449
Percent 64.33 64.31 64.35
Notes: We only present the number of observations that are available on father’s and grandfa-
ther’s education level, because we will condition on father’s or grandfather’s education level in
the analysis. We only have information on the highest level of education for those individuals
that are not older than 60 years in the year of the 1970 census. We report the number of indi-
viduals in each sample, the number of individuals for which we have information on the highest
level of education on their fathers or grandfathers and the share of those for which we have
this information with the lowest education level. For the children generation with low educated
grandfathers on their father’s side of the family, we consider those children whose father was
born between 1945 and 1955. For the children generation with low educated grandfathers on
the mother’s side of the family we consider those whose mother was born between 1945 and
1955.
44Table 13: Number of all convictions in Sweden between 1981-2008
All Male Female
Number of convicted persons 1,249,569 966,790 282,779
Number of persons convicted to prison 366,639 344,919 21,720
Number of convictions in total 3,014,811 2,534,337 480,474
Number of prison sentences in total 1,204,711 1,115,428 89,283
Convictions by age groups
age 15 -24 1,128,125 950,413 177,712
age 25-34 710,177 605,445 104,732
age 35-44 577,693 483,821 93,872
age 45-54 355,396 296,971 58,425
age 55-64 161,367 133,788 27,579
age 65-80 76,296 59,138 17,158
age > 80 5,757 4,761 996
Notes: 78% to 85% of the convictions are males.
Table 14: Data on all suspected crimes in Sweden between 1991-2009.
Sons of men or women born 1945-1955.
Number of persons suspected for a crime 1991-2009
All crimes Excluding traﬃc Excluding some traﬃc
Sample: Sons of men born 45-55
129,683 117,279 124,487
Percent of sample 20.95 18.94 20.11
Sample: Sons of men born 45-55 with low educated father
54,542 48,888 52,222
Percent of sample 20.71 18.57 19.83
Sample: Sons of women born 45-55
133,953 120,748 129,217
Percent of sample 20.50 18.48 19.78
Sample: Sons of women born 45-55 with low educated father
55,210 49,294 129,217
Percent of sample 19.95 17.81 19.78
Notes: The category Excluding traﬃc excludes all traﬃc crime categories. All
traﬃc crime categories are listed in Table 16. The category Excluding some
traﬃc excludes the traﬃc crime categories "Driving without a license", "Allowed
driving without license" and "Override provision".
45Figure 2: Life cycle convicted crimes
Figure 3: Life cycle convicted crimes
46Table 15: Persons found guilty of criminal oﬀences, by principal oﬀence
Number of Share, %
convictions, 2009
Crimes against penal code 59,542 42.1
Of which
Crimes against life and health 9,744 6.9
Of which
Murder and man-slaughter 150 0.1
Assault, gross assault 9,268 6.5
Sexual oﬀences 1,090 0.8
Of which:
Rape 256 0.2
Theft, robbery, other oﬀences of stealing 29,393 20.8
Of which:
Theft, gross theft 9,233 6.5
Petty theft 17,953 12.7
Robbery, gross robbery 1,049 0.7
Vehicle theft 824 0.6
Fraud and other dishonesty 3,175 2.2
Crimes inﬂicting damage 3,316 2.3
Violent threat to public servant 2,544 1.8
Other 10,280 7.3
Crimes to other penal legislation 82,035 57.9
Crimes against the Road traﬃc oﬀences act 47,020 33.2
Of which
Drunken driving, gross drunken driving 13,253 9.4
Crimes against the Narcotics drugs act 18,525 13.1
Crimes against the Act on smuggling 2,076 1.5
Other 14,414 10.2
All crimes 141,577 100
Notes: Persons found guilty of criminal oﬀences, by principal oﬀence, 2009. Source: Kriminal-










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































48Table 17: Linear probability estimates of the association between own
education and criminal behavior. Men born between 1945-1955.
Dependent variables Probability conviction Probability prison




Upper secondary -7.471*** -3.928***
(1.028) (0.287)







Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are scaled by 100. Robust
standard errors in parentheses, clustered by birth municipality. All regressions include a full
set of birth cohort dummies and birth municipality dummies.
8.4 Result appendix
8.4.1 Additional Results - First Generation
To avoid the computational diﬃculties involved in estimating a logit model
with 1,000 municipality ﬁxed eﬀects and 11 cohorts we use a minimum dis-
tance procedure. We collapse the sample to 10,744 municipality-cohort cells
by computing the log-odds ratio within each cell. For 691 municipality-
cohort cells the proportion of observed crime was zero and hence the
log-odds ratio is not deﬁned. For 108 cells we cannot assign the reform
status, which leaves us with 9,949 municipality-cohort observations. We
then regress the log-odds ratio on the municipality and cohort dummies
as well as on the reform indicator using GLS. Each cell was weighted by
p
pc(1   pc)Nc, where Nc is the cell size and pc is the within cell probability
of a conviction. The corresponding marginal eﬀects for diﬀerent cohorts of
49Table 18: Linear probability model estimates of the association between
parental education and own criminal behavior. Sons of parents born 1945-
1955.
Dependent variables Probability conviction Probability prison
 p = 0:2645  p = 0:0343
Panel A: Education levels father
Vocational -2.075*** -0.694***
(0.214) (0.088)
Upper secondary -8.083*** -2.342***
(0.339) (0.142)







Panel B: Education levels mother
Vocational -4.356*** -1.556***
(0.291) (0.102)
Upper secondary -8.119*** -2.648***
(0.473) (0.181)







Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered by birth municipality. Each education level is indicated as a indicator variable. The omitted
education level is the lowest education level combined levels 1 and 2. All regressions include a full
set of birth cohort dummies and birth municipality dummies.
the logit model are presented in Table 19. Table 20 shows the linear proba-
bility model estimates for the dependent variable prison sentence. For this
dependent variable it is not possible to repeat the procedure for the logit
estimation, since the proportion of prison sentences is too small, which
50prevents us from computing the log-odds ratios.
Table 19: Logit estimates of the eﬀects of the education reform on the proba-
bility of ever being convicted; by birth cohort groups, separated by education
level of fathers.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cohorts 45-55 50-55 51-55 52-55 53-55 54-55
Dependent variable: having been convicted at least once
Panel A: Sample of all men
Probability conviction 0.253 0.268 0.271 0.275 0.278 0.284
Reform -0.023 -0.284 -0.434 -1.274* -0.999 -1.395
(0.281) (0.422) (0.500) (0.654) (0.911) (1.361)
Percentage change -0.091 -1.057 -1.598 -4.639 -3.591 -4.916
Share convicted
Observations 622,583 319,093 263,592 210,399 157,155 103,761
Panel B: Sample of men with low educated father
Probability conviction 0.234 0.252 0.255 0.259 0.263 0.269
Reform -0.022 -0.272 -0.417 -1.227* -0.965 -1.351
(0.271) (0.405) (0.480) (0.630) (0.879) (1.318)
Percentage change -0.093 -1.081 -1.633 -4.741 -3.666 -5.015
Share convicted
Observations 264,679 150,620 125,952 101,266 76,207 50,222
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. We report maginal eﬀects of a logit estimation,
scaled by 100. Robust standard errors in parantheses, clustered by municipality of birth. All regressions
include a full set of birth municipality and birth cohort dummies.
8.4.2 Additional Results - Children Generation
When we collapse the data set by cohort-municipality level as a ﬁrst step
to estimating the logit model, we do it by father’s cohort-municipality
level which gives us 10,607 cells for the father’s sample, and 10,247 for
the sample with low educated paternal grandfathers. For the speciﬁcation
51Table 20: Estimates of the eﬀects of the education reform on the probability of ever being
convicted to a prison sentence; by birth cohort groups, separated by education level of
fathers.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cohorts 45-55 50-55 51-55 52-55 53-55 54-55
Dependent variable: indicator for having been convicted to a prison sentence at least once
Panel A: Sample of all men
Probability prison conviction 0.054 0.060 0.062 0.063 0.064 0.066
Reform -0.149 -0.064 0.038 -0.097 -0.111 -0.094
(0.160) (0.173) (0.192) (0.272) (0.328) (0.228)
Percentage change -2.770 -1.065 0.617 -1.547 -1.732 -1.416
Observations 622,583 319,093 263,592 210,399 157,155 103,761
Panel B: Sample of men with low educated father
Probability prison conviction 0.051 0.055 0.057 0.058 0.059 0.061
Reform -0.049 -0.158 -0.303 -0.551* -0.778** -1.011
(0.171) (0.217) (0.245) (0.312) (0.394) (0.716)
Percentage change -0.970 -2.852 -5.316 -9.484 -13.120 -16.574
Observations 264,679 150,620 125,952 101,266 76,207 50,222
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal eﬀects are scaled by 100. Robust standard errors
in parantheses, clustered by municipality of birth. All regressions include a full set of birth municipality and birth
cohort dummies. The reported estimates in both panels are from a linear probability estimation with weighted least
squares for the dependent variable probability of being convicted to a prison sentence at least once. The used weights
are:
p
x0b(1   x0b), which are obtained from a ﬁrst stage OLS estimation.
with mother’s reform assignment we collapse the data by mother’s cohort-
municipality level which leads to 10,647 for the entire sample and 10,324
for the low educated maternal grandfathers sample.
The log-odds-ratio estimates from the logit model translate into a marginal
eﬀect of a 0.646 percentage points decrease in the probability of a convic-
tion, which is very similar to the marginal eﬀect obtained from the linear
probability model (LP column). Hence, the logit model suggests similar to
the linear probability model, that father’s reform assignment signiﬁcantly
reduces the total share of convicted men by about 2.5 percent.
52As can be seen in Table 22, the results of the linear probability model
for the eﬀects of the reform status of father and mother on the probability
of a prison sentence of sons show no signiﬁcant eﬀects.
Table 21: Logit estimates of father’s and mother’s reform assignment on the
probability of their sons having ever been convicted.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logit Marginal eﬀect Logit Marginal eﬀect
Sample: All All Low educ Low educ
Dependent variable: son has ever been convicted to prison
Panel A: Father’s reform assignment
Probability conviction 0.265 0.265 0.247 0.247
Reform father -0.033** -0.646*** -0.052*** -0.972***
(0.015) (0.296) (0.020) (0.366)
Percentage change -2.443 -3.938
Observations 563,754 563,754 243,082 243,082
Panel B: Mother’s reform assignment
Probability conviction 0.265 0.265 0.278 0.278
Reform mother 0.012 0.225 0.021 0.419
(0.014) (0.277) (0.018) (0.363)
Percentage change 0.851 1.509
Observations 595,138 595,138 255,075 255,075
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal eﬀects of the Logit estimates are
scaled by 100. Robust Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality of birth of the father
(Panel A) or mother (Panel B). All regressions include a full set of birth municipality dummies and
birth cohort dummies of father or mother.
53Table 22: Estimates of father’s and mother’s reform as-
signment on the probability of their sons having ever been
convicted to a prison sentence.
(1) (2)
Sample: All Low educ
Dependent variable: son has ever been convicted to prison
Panel A: Father’s reform assignment
Probability prison  p = 0:034  p = 0:028
Reform father 0.015 0.005
(0.093) (0.123)
Percentage Change 0.448 0.169
Observations 563,754 243,082
Panel B: Mother’s reform assignment
Probability prison p = 0:034 p = 0:028
Reform mother 0.038 0.004
(0.093) (0.130)
Percentage change 1.093 0.108
Observations 595,138 255,075
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal eﬀects
are scaled by 100. Robust Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by
municipality of birth of the father (Panel A) or mother (Panel B). All
regressions include a full set of birth municipality dummies and birth cohort
dummies of father or mother. Presented estimates from a linear probability
model with weighted least squares, the used weights are:
p
x0b(1   x0b)
obtained from ﬁrst stage OLS estimations. Column (1) presents results for
all sons of men or women born 45-55, and column (2) for those sons whose































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Individuals who were assigned to the reform might be more likely to move
to higher income/lower crime areas later in life. Our strategy to study
this is to use pre-reform municipality income levels from the year 1960
to classify municipalities into lower than median income and higher than
median income municipalities before the reform, since the reform itself may
have aﬀected post reform municipality characteristics.31 Our main focus is
to see whether individuals assigned to the reform are more likely to move
from low to high income municipalities. For this mobility analysis across
municipalities we will use individual information on birth municipalities,
the municipality of residence in 1991 and municipality income levels in
1960. For each individual we will assign the income level of their birth
municipality and whether it was below or above median income in 1960.
Furthermore, we determine where each individual lived in 1991 and assign
the income level of that municipality but at the pre-reform income level in
1960, as well as the according income classiﬁcation.
This analysis is complicated by the fact that Sweden’s municipalities went
through several reforms between 1953 and 1986 that changed the local
government district division and the numerical codes used in administrative
data. In our data we have 1046 diﬀerent municipality codes in 1952. By
1986 Sweden’s amount of municipalities was reduced to 286.32.
The reduction of municipalities was mainly done through merges of
several municipalities. More speciﬁcally, 965 municipalities were merged
with neighboring municipalities to build municipalities with one code or
in some cases remained the same. In these cases we are able to assign
31Unfortunately, we do not have crime records on municipality level before 1981.
32All municipality code changes are taken from the report of Statistics Sweden that
lists all municipality code and administrative division changes between 1952-1986:
Sveriges kommuner åren 1952-1986 Förändringar i kommunindelning och kommunkoder,
SCB Meddelanden i samordningsfrågor, Sverige (1986): 5; most changes were ﬁnalized
already before 1976
56unique new post-municipality reform codes that correspond to the previous
municipality codes.
However, in a few cases municipalities were split up into several other
communities: 76 of the original 1046 municipalities were split up into 2
diﬀerent municipalities, and 8 original ones were split up into 3 diﬀerent
municipalities. For those 84 cases of split ups we cannot determine new
post-municipality reform codes that uniquely correspond to the before 1952
municipality codes. Due to this ambiguity we decided to assign the munic-
ipality code of the municipality with the highest population among those
municipalities into which the municipality was divided.33 All together this
process led to the mentioned 298 municipalities by 1986.
For our mobility analysis we use the population weighted average of mu-
nicipality income levels of 1960 for the new 298 municipalities and whether
it is below or above median income. More speciﬁcally, the income levels
of the new municipality codes are computed using the 1960 income lev-
els and population sizes of the municipalities that will later build the new
municipalities. We match this information to each individual to assign a
municipality income level according their birth municipality and a munic-
ipality income level according to their municipality of residence in 1991
both as of 1960 levels and according to the new municipality codes. All
birth municipality codes are thus brought in accordance with the new codes
after the municipality reform and those are used for the analysis because
one would obtain a mechanical move of individuals by the changes of mu-
nicipality codes even though individuals did not move.
33When matching the data some municipalities where individuals lived in 1991 did
not appear in our municipality coding because they were split up municipality cases and
the higher population destination was chosen. In these ﬁve cases we assign the income
level of the municipality that was not chosen by our rule.
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